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What Is Reasonable Cause To  
Believe?: The Mens Rea Required For  
Conviction Under 21 U.S.C. § 841 
 
Jonathan L. Hood* 
 
Over the past decade, a number of circuit courts have examined a 
seemingly straightforward statute and come to dramatically different 
conclusions as to its meaning.  21 U.S.C. § 841 provides: 
 
Any person who knowingly or intentionally . . . 
possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing, or 
having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed 
chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled 
substance except as authorized by this subchapter . . . 
shall be fined in accordance with Title 18 or imprisoned 
not more than . . . 20 years . . . .
1
 
 
The differences in interpretation involve the statute‘s phrase 
―knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe.‖  Specifically, courts 
differ on whether the statute requires the prosecution to prove that the 
defendant knew the medication would be used for the manufacture of 
illicit substances, or whether he should have known that was the likely 
outcome. 
The cases in which this disagreement has arisen deal with 
defendants who purchase or sell large amounts of pseudoephedrine, a list 
I chemical,
2
 in violation of § 841.  Pseudoephedrine, commonly used in 
decongestant medications, is also a necessary ingredient for the 
production of methamphetamine, a highly addictive and debilitating drug 
 
  *  B.S., Longwood University (2006); J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of 
Law (expected 2011).  The author wishes to extend his sincerest appreciation to his 
family, for their unyielding support and encouragement; to Jessica Cardichon, his Note 
Editor, for her invaluable editing suggestions; and to Prof. Audrey Rogers, for providing 
him with a solid foundation in the fundamentals of criminal law. 
1. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c) (2006). 
2. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., ASSESSMENT OF 
ANNUAL NEEDS FOR THE LIST I CHEMICALS EPHEDRINE, PSEUDOEPHEDRINE, AND 
PHENYLPROPANOLAMINE FOR 2008: PROPOSED (2007), available at 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/quotas/2007/fr09203.htm. 
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that is gaining popularity in the United States, especially in rural areas.
3
  
Essentially, courts have been forced to decide whether a defendant must 
know that the pseudoephedrine is going to be used specifically for the 
production of methamphetamine, or whether, under a reasonable-person 
standard, he merely should know that this is the case. 
The majority of courts have adopted the objective standard, 
requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant had ―reasonable 
cause to believe‖ that his actions would lead to the manufacture of illegal 
drugs.  The Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all adopted this 
view.
4
  Only the Tenth Circuit has adopted the subjective standard, 
requiring the prosecution to prove actual knowledge on the defendant‘s 
part.
5
  Recently, the Seventh Circuit had to address the circuit split when 
deciding United States v. Khattab.
6
  The court ultimately avoided 
choosing between the two competing mens rea standards, holding that 
the defendant would be found guilty under either the objective or the 
subjective standard.  However, the court‘s dilemma underscores the gulf 
between the two competing views of § 841, and ultimately raises the 
question of how the Supreme Court will define the required mens rea if 
and when it is faced with the same question.
7
 
 
I.  The Role of Mens Rea in Criminal Law 
 
Mens rea is a core concept in criminal law.  It refers to the mental 
state necessary for conviction of a given offense.
8
  The required state of 
mind is often listed as an element of the crime.
9
  The idea of a ―guilty 
mind‖ is so central to criminal law that courts continue to enforce the 
common law requirement that every crime include a mens rea element.
10
  
 
3. Morning Edition: Meth a Growing Menace in Rural America (NPR radio 
broadcast Aug. 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=3805074. 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Estrada, 453 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2000). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2000). 
6. 536 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008). 
7. It should be noted that outside of the five circuits discussed here no other court 
has explicitly addressed the issue of which mens rea is required under § 841. 
8. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 117 (2008). 
9. Id. 
10. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253 (1922) (cited in Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994)). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/12
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This rule applies with equal force to statutory crimes, unless the 
prosecution can show that the legislature either expressly or impliedly 
waived the requirement.
11
  Criminal offenses without a mens rea 
requirement are ―generally disfavored,‖12 and the mere fact that a statute 
does not define or mention a mens rea element is not enough to dispense 
with it entirely.
13
  The default requirement of a mens rea is rooted in the 
ages-old notion that ―an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no 
crime at all,‖14 and reflects the ―common sense view of justice that blame 
and punishment are inappropriate and unfair in the absence of choice.‖15 
There are two broad categories of mens rea—subjective and 
objective.  Subjective mens rea requires proof of what the defendant 
actually knew at the time of the offense.
16
  Objective mens rea, by 
contrast, requires proof of what the defendant should have known.
17
  The 
objective standard sets a substantially lower bar for the prosecution, 
since it can prove ―knowledge‖ from the standpoint of the traditional 
objective person, rather than having to prove that a particular defendant 
had a certain state of mind.
18
  The competing views are often relevant 
during murder trials.  For instance, at least one court has held that first-
degree ―depraved mind‖ murder employs a subjective standard, while a 
second-degree murder conviction requires only an objective standard.
19
  
The debate over the meaning of ―knowledge, or a reasonable cause to 
believe‖ in § 841 essentially boils down to one between an objective 
mens rea and a subjective one—is the prosecution required to prove that 
a defendant knew the pseudoephedrine would be used for illicit purposes, 
or merely that he should have known? 
 
 
11. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (cited in Staples, 
511 U.S. 600, 616). 
12. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438 (cited in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 
419, 426 (1985)). 
13. Id. 
14. SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 213 (8th ed. 2007). 
15. Id. 
16. Vicki W. Zelle, Criminal Law – The Anomaly of a Murder: Not All First-
Degree Murder Mens Rea Standards are Equal – State v. Brown, 28 N.M. L. REV. 553, 
559-60 (1998). 
17. Id. 
18. See generally id. 
19. Id. at 558-59 (citing State v. McCrary, 675 P.2d 120 (N.M. 1984)). 
3
2010] REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 1363 
A. Factors to Consider when a Mens Rea Requirement is Ambiguous 
 
Courts weigh a number of factors in interpreting an ambiguous 
mens rea requirement.  Whenever possible, courts look to the plain 
meaning of the statute in question to determine how it should be 
applied.
20
  Two circuits have held that the plain text of § 841 demands 
the use of an objective mens rea standard.  In United States v. Estrada, 
the defendant was found next to an overturned pickup truck that 
contained 178 pounds of pseudoephedrine pills, along with denatured 
alcohol and paraphernalia.
21
  At trial, Estrada argued that the government 
had to prove that he knew the pills were pseudoephedrine.
22
  The court 
rejected this argument, holding that such a requirement ―would import a 
second mens rea requirement into the statute: knowledge or reasonable 
cause to believe that the substance will be used in the manufacture of a 
controlled substance plus knowledge of the identity of the substance 
possessed. . . .‖23  The Ninth Circuit held that, under the statute, the 
prosecution need only show that the defendant possessed a listed 
chemical, with reasonable cause to believe it would be used to produce a 
controlled substance.
24
 
In United States v. Kaur, another Ninth Circuit case, the defendant 
was convicted under § 841 after selling large amounts of 
pseudoephedrine to an informant with the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(―DEA‖) at his convenience store.25  The court again rejected any 
subjective interpretation of the statute, reasoning that the statute ―clearly 
presents knowledge and reasonable cause to believe as two distinct 
alternatives; reasonable cause to believe would be superfluous if it meant 
knowledge.‖26  The Eighth Circuit echoed this position in United States 
v. Galvan, favorably quoting the Kaur court‘s assertion that a subjective 
instruction ―would ‗effectively equate . . . reasonable cause to believe 
with actual knowledge‘ and thereby render the ‗reasonable cause to 
 
20. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 983 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); United States v. Vallery, 
437 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2006); Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
21. United States v. Estrada, 453 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir. 2006). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1212 (emphasis added). 
24. Id. 
25. United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2004). 
26. Id. at 1157 (citing Conn. Nat‘l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) 
(internal citations omitted)). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/12
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believe‘ phrase redundant.‖27 
The Tenth Circuit is thus far alone in adopting the subjective ―actual 
knowledge‖ standard.  In United States v. Saffo, the court explained that 
the standard set forth in § 841 ―requires scienter to be evaluated through 
the lens of this particular defendant, rather than from the prospective 
[sic] of a hypothetical reasonable man.‖28  In light of the overwhelming 
evidence against Saffo, along with the jury‘s parallel conviction for a 
money laundering charge, the court was satisfied that the subjective 
standard had been met, and upheld the conviction.
29
  The record showed 
that Saffo had, inter alia, rented storage units under fictitious names, torn 
labels off boxes before shipping them, ensured that her name was kept 
off purchase orders, destroyed all paperwork regarding the purchases, 
and made contradictory statements about her knowledge of ―Red 
Notices,‖ sent to distributors to warn them that pseudoephedrine is often 
used to manufacture methamphetamine.
30
  The wealth of evidence 
satisfied the court that ―Saffo had actual knowledge that the 
pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, not 
that [s]he merely had ‗reasonable cause to believe‘ it would be so 
used.‖31 
The court reaffirmed this view, albeit with a different result, in 
United States v. Truong, where the defendant was convicted at trial of 
continually selling large amounts of pseudoephedrine to a customer at 
the defendant‘s gas station.32  Copious evidence was offered at trial 
indicating that the defendant knew his behavior was illegal: he always 
sold the drugs after the store closed, with the lights out, and concealed 
the pills in Styrofoam cups for the customer to carry out.
33
  In spite of 
this evidence, however, the court overturned Truong‘s conviction, 
holding that while his behavior signaled that he knew the substance 
would be used illegally, this was not sufficient for conviction under § 
841.  The court conceded that: 
 
 
27. United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kaur, 382 F.3d 
at 1157). 
28. United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
added). 
29. Id. at 1269. 
30. Id. at 1264-65. 
31. Id. at 1269. 
32. United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005). 
33. Id. at 1285. 
5
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the government presented an abundance of evidence 
from which a jury might reasonably infer that Mr. 
Truong knew that his customers ‗were up to no good.‘. . 
. The huge quantity and clandestine circumstances of the 
sales would surely have put any reasonable person on 
notice that something nefarious was going on.
34
 
 
Regardless, the court held that ―the unusually specific mens rea 
requirement‖ limits application of the statute ―to sellers with the actual 
knowledge or intent (or, in this Circuit, something ‗akin to actual 
knowledge‘) that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.‖35 
 
B. Mens Rea Interpretations in Comparable Cases 
 
Another factor to consider when interpreting a vague mens rea 
standard is the seriousness of the defendant‘s conduct and the extent of 
its effect on society.  Broadly speaking, courts are more willing to 
require an objective mens rea showing when the crime in question has 
serious repercussions, since a lower burden for the prosecution tends to 
discourage individuals from committing the crime in the first place.
36
  By 
contrast, courts considering ―victimless‖ or less serious crimes often 
require a subjective mens rea for conviction, since punishment for these 
crimes may be unnecessary or unjust if the individual did not intend to 
break the law.  Given the relatively small number of cases discussing § 
841 in particular, it is helpful to examine which mens rea standard courts 
have required for similarly serious crimes. 
 
1.  An Objective Mens Rea is Preferred for Serious Crimes 
 
Gun crimes provide an illustrative example; in these cases, courts 
often apply a subjective standard, given the grave consequences of a 
conviction for the defendant.
37
  In United States v. Staples, the defendant 
 
34. Id. at 1290 (internal citations omitted). 
35. Id. at 1291. 
36. Simona Agnolucci, Deportation of Human Rights Abusers: Towards Achieving 
Accountability, Not Fostering Impunity, 30 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 347, 364 
(2007). 
37. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); United States v. 
Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/12
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was convicted at trial of possessing a fully automatic rifle, in violation of 
the National Firearms Act.
38
  The evidence showed that the gun had been 
modified before it was sold to the defendant and that from every outward 
appearance it looked like a semi-automatic rifle, possession of which is 
not illegal.
39
  The Supreme Court overturned Staples‘s conviction, ruling 
that it would be unconscionable to convict a ―law-abiding, well-
intentioned citizen[ ]‖ of such a grave felony when he truly and 
reasonably believed that his gun was not fully automatic.
40
 
Indeed, a number of courts have proved unwilling to convict 
defendants of gun-related felonies without a showing that they knew the 
true nature of the weapon.  In United States v. Anderson, the defendant 
was convicted of possessing automatic firearms, in violation of the 
National Firearms Act.
41
  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that for a 
conviction, the government must prove that the defendant knew the 
weapons were ―firearms‖ as defined by the Act, not just that they were 
―firearms‖ in the general sense of the word.42  Similarly, in United States 
v. Herbert, the defendants sold guns that were originally semi-automatic 
weapons, but that had been modified to be fully automatic weapons.
43
  
The Ninth Circuit overturned the defendants‘ convictions, holding that 
when there is no indication that an otherwise legal-looking gun has been 
modified to bring it within the category of those prohibited by the Act, 
conviction is improper.
44
 
Courts are less united on the issue of whether a subjective or 
objective mens rea is required for drug-related felonies.  As with gun 
crimes, conviction of a drug offense can lead to a lengthy prison term 
and a serious criminal record.  Indeed, courts tend to impose harsh 
sentences on those convicted of drug crimes, given the detrimental 
impact these crimes have on others‘ lives.45  However, unlike a defendant 
in a gun crime case, an individual charged with a drug offense has 
generally caused serious consequences whether he intended to or not.  
That is, even when a defendant is unaware that he is responsible for the 
proliferation of controlled substances, the drugs are still being distributed 
and causing harm to those who purchase them.  By contrast, a defendant 
 
38. Staples, 511 U.S. at 615. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. (citing Anderson, 885 F.2d at 1251, 1253-54). 
41. Anderson, 885 F.2d at 1248. 
42. Id. at 1252. 
43. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981. 
44. Id. at 986-87. 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 239 F. App‘x 202, 210 (6th Cir. 2007). 
7
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in a gun case ostensibly intends to harm his victim, and whether his rifle 
is fully or partially automatic plays a minimal role, if any at all.  The 
individual charged with a drug crime need not intend or even know the 
ramifications of his conduct; its effects on society will generally be the 
same. 
When deciding drug-related cases, courts often weigh the gravity of 
the defendant‘s alleged conduct against the possibility that he will be 
wrongfully or unjustly convicted.  In United States v. Balint, the 
defendant was convicted of selling opium, in violation of the Narcotic 
Act.
46
  The defendant argued that because he was unaware that opium 
was prohibited by the act his conviction must be overturned.  The 
Supreme Court balanced the serious consequences that resulted from the 
defendant‘s drug sales against his ignorance of the drug‘s illegality, and 
decisively found that the former was more important, stating that 
―Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller 
to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger 
from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to 
be avoided.‖47  The Court went so far as to ignore the common law rule 
that a mens rea must be read into every statute, saying that requiring 
knowledge of the drug‘s illegality would completely defeat the purpose 
of the statute, which is to ―minimiz[e] the spread of addiction to the use 
of poisonous and demoralizing drugs.‖48 
By contrast, in United States v. Londono-Villa, the defendant was 
convicted at trial of knowingly or intentionally importing a controlled 
substance into the United States, in violation of the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act.
49
  The evidence showed that 
Londono flew with a DEA informant to Colombia, where he helped him 
procure cocaine.
50
  Although the cocaine was eventually transported to 
the United States, there was no evidence that Londono intended or even 
knew that the drugs would be shipped to America.
51
  At trial, when asked 
by the jury for clarification, the district court stated that ―the defendant 
need not have specific knowledge that the cocaine was to be imported 
into the United States.‖52  The Second Circuit reversed the defendant‘s 
conviction, noting that the statute explicitly requires a finding that the 
 
46. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922). 
47. Id. at 254. 
48. Id. at 253. 
49. United States v. Londono-Villa, 930 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1991). 
50. Id. at 996. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/12
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defendant ―knowingly or intentionally import[ed] . . . a controlled 
substance . . . .‖53  This language, the Court said, clearly indicated that 
the ―government is required to prove that the defendant knew or intended 
that the destination of the narcotics would be the United States.‖54  The 
Court also noted that a majority of other circuits considering cases under 
the statute similarly required a showing of intent for a conviction.
55
 
 
2.  A Subjective Mens Rea is Preferred for Negligible Crimes 
 
For crimes involving a greatly reduced danger to the public, courts 
have been much less willing to convict without a showing that the 
defendant actually knew he was violating the statute in question.  This is 
consistent with the desire to ―provide fair warning concerning conduct 
rendered illegal . . . .‖56  Allowing conviction for so-called victimless 
crimes without a mens rea requirement of some sort would serve none of 
the purposes of criminal law.  For example, in Morissette v. United 
States, the defendant was convicted of knowingly converting government 
property after he salvaged and sold bomb casings he found on 
government land.
57
  Although the defendant testified that he thought the 
property was abandoned, and that he had no intent to steal anything, the 
district court ruled that such intent was not necessary for conviction.
58
  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that ―presumptive intent has no 
place in this case.‖59  The Court was unwilling to convict the defendant 
without a clear showing of his intent to violate the statute in question. 
Similarly, in Liparota v. United States, the defendant was convicted 
of purchasing food stamps for an amount considerably below their actual 
value, in violation of a statute governing food stamp fraud.
60
  In 
overturning the defendant‘s conviction, the Supreme Court held that it 
was not enough for the government to show that the defendant possessed 
the food stamps in a manner prohibited by law and that he knowingly 
acquired the stamps.
61
  Rather, for conviction, the government was 
required to show that the defendant knew that the manner in which he 
 
53. Id. at 997. 
54. Id. at 998. 
55. Id. at 999. 
56. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985). 
57. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 275. 
60. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
61. Id. at 429. 
9
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acquired the food stamps was prohibited by law.
62
  In its holding, the 
Court noted that without such a requirement, individuals could be 
punished for conduct that, on its face, seems harmless.  The statute 
approved the use of food stamps only for ―food [purchase] in retail food 
stores which have been approved for participation in the food stamp 
program at prices prevailing in such stores.‖63  Thus, without requiring a 
showing of mens rea, the government could conceivably prosecute 
individuals who unwittingly bought groceries at higher-than-approved 
prices, or individuals not qualified for the food stamp program but who 
erroneously received them through the mail.
64
 
 
3.  Crimes Involving Duties to Others 
 
Courts have been very receptive to the objective mens rea standard 
of ―reasonable cause to believe‖ when considering actions taken by 
government officials in furtherance of their duties.
65
  The line of 
reasoning running through these cases suggests that courts are willing to 
give a defendant the benefit of the doubt when his conduct was taken in 
the interest of protecting the public.  For example, the Sixth Circuit held 
that an officer‘s entry onto property, without a warrant, to prevent the 
destruction of evidence, is acceptable if the government can show: ―(1) a 
reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling; and (2) a 
reasonable belief that the loss or destruction of evidence is imminent.‖66  
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit also held that a finding of probable cause by 
an arresting officer is based on his reasonable belief under the 
circumstances, and not necessarily on any actual knowledge he has at the 
time he makes the decision.
67
 
In a similar vein, courts have permitted an objective, rather than 
subjective, mens rea standard when an individual fails to act to protect 
those in his care.  In Farmer v. Brennan, a transsexual prisoner harmed 
by other inmates sued prison officials, accusing them of ―deliberate 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 426 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2016(b) (2002)). 
64. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426-27. 
65. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); United States v. Gaitan-
Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223 (6th 
Cir. 1991). 
66. Straughter, 950 F.2d at 1230 (citing United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 
F.2d 1501, 1512 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added)). 
67. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d at 577 (citing Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/12
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indifference‖ for placing him in the prison population.68  The Court held 
that for the guard to be liable the complainant need only show that the 
official knew of a ―substantial risk of harm‖ and acted (or failed to act) in 
a manner that did nothing to diminish that risk.
69
  In so holding, the 
Court reasoned that an objective mens rea requirement would better 
motivate prison officials to act to protect the well-being of inmates.
70
 
Broadly speaking, these cases suggest that courts generally view an 
objective mens rea as sufficient when the crime in question poses a large 
risk to the population at large and are willing to accept the risks that this 
approach may pose to the defendant.  In an extreme but illustrative 
example, the Balint court explicitly said that Congress was willing to run 
the risk of convicting well-meaning opium salesmen, given the far-
reaching and severe effects of opium abuse.
71
  By contrast, courts 
considering less harmful crimes like conversion of government property 
or food stamp fraud seem less willing to convict defendants unless it is 
shown that they knew their conduct was illegal but proceeded with it 
anyway.
72
  In these situations, the consequences of the defendant‘s 
actions are simply not severe enough to justify conviction unless the 
conduct is shown to have been deliberate and willful. 
 
II.  Supreme Court Decision on the Mens Rea Required by § 841 
 
Should the issue addressed here reach the Supreme Court, it will 
have to choose between the objective and subjective mens rea standards.  
In making its decision, the Court should examine the previously 
discussed factors: the plain meaning of the statute, the policy reasons 
behind its enactment, the severity of the crime in question and its impact 
on society, and the interest in preventing erroneous or unjust convictions.  
Balancing these factors, the Supreme Court should apply the objective 
mens rea standard to cases involving § 841.  Requiring the prosecution to 
show merely that the defendant should have known that the 
pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture a listed chemical is 
justified for a number of reasons: language in the statute suggests that 
Congress intended an objective standard, methamphetamine‘s 
 
68. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825. 
69. Id. at 842. 
70. Id. 
71. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922). 
72. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
11
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debilitating effects and growing popularity justify an approach favoring 
the prosecution, and several safeguards are in place to prevent erroneous 
convictions.  Additionally, a subjective standard places an extremely 
high burden on the prosecution, making conviction practically 
impossible in many cases despite evidence that the defendant clearly 
knew his conduct was illegal. 
 
A. Plain Statutory Meaning 
 
The language of § 841 relating to mens rea is relatively 
straightforward.  While the very existence of a circuit split suggests that 
Congress could have more clearly explained the required level of mens 
rea, there is merit to the Kaur court‘s argument that the statute explicitly 
lists two alternative mens rea sufficient for conviction.
73
  It seems 
unlikely that Congress would have included ―having reasonable cause to 
believe‖ if they desired an absolute showing that the defendant knew the 
drugs would be used to produce a list chemical.  Indeed, if Congress 
wanted an absolute showing of knowledge on the defendant‘s part, they 
would likely have explicitly required it.
74
 
It is worth noting that courts have rejected the argument that the 
language of § 841 is unconstitutionally vague.
75
  For a law to pass 
constitutional muster, the statute must ―define the criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct 
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.‖76  The court in Saffo held that § 841 meets 
this standard, noting that ―a scienter requirement may mitigate a law‘s 
vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the 
complainant that [her] conduct is proscribed.‖77 
 
 
73. United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2004). 
74. See Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672, 678 (Sup. Ct. Ohio 1997) (rejecting the 
view that issuance of an order of protection requires a ―clear-and-convincing‖ standard of 
proof, noting that ―[t]he General Assembly, had it wanted to do so, knew how to specify 
a ‗clear and convincing‘ standard.  A review of the Revised Code reveals at least nineteen 
sections in which the General Assembly has specified a ‗clear and convincing‘ standard 
by using the words ‗clear and convincing.‘‖). 
75. United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268-70 (10th Cir. 2000).  See also 
United States v. Merkosky, 135 F. App‘x 828, 834 (6th Cir. 2005). 
76. Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1270 (quoting United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 802 
(10th Cir. 1997)). 
77. Id. at 1270 n.8 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 
489, 499 (1982)). 
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B. Public Policy and Methamphetamine’s Noxious Consequences 
 
Even assuming that the language of the statute is ambiguous, public 
policy argues strongly for an objective mens rea standard.  As with the 
drug cases discussed supra, the conduct that § 841 seeks to regulate—the 
manufacture of methamphetamine—has extremely serious consequences 
for society.  A United Nations estimate found that methamphetamine is 
the most widely abused hard drug on earth, used by almost twice as 
many people as cocaine and heroin combined.
78
  It is impossible to 
exaggerate the toll that methamphetamine takes on its users and those 
closest to them. 
Methamphetamine is listed as a Schedule II stimulant under the 
Controlled Substances Act, of which § 841 is a part.
79
  Schedule II drugs 
are defined as those with a high potential for abuse, which are available 
only through a prescription, and excessive use of which may lead to 
―severe psychological or physical dependence.‖80  Methamphetamine is 
the most common synthetic, or non-organic, drug in the United States.
81
 
Abuse of methamphetamine poses a number of very serious risks.  
Long-term abuse results in extreme weight loss, severe dental problems, 
and anxiety or depression, just to name a few.
82
  In extreme cases, it can 
also cause seizures, strokes, hyperthermia (increased body temperature), 
and even death.
83
  Methamphetamine abuse causes structural changes in 
the brain, some of which are present long after use has stopped and may 
even be permanent.
84
  The drug is also believed to have adverse effects 
 
78. Virginia Heffernan, An Illegal Drug From Labs That Can‘t Be Shut Down, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, at E8. 
79. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1990).  See also NAT‘L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, INFOFACTS: 
METHAMPHETAMINE (2008) 
http://www.nida.nih.gov/pdf/infofacts/Methamphetamine08.pdf [hereinafter NIDA 
INFOFACTS]. 
80. 21 U.S.C. § 812. 
81. WASHINGTON/BALTIMORE HIDTA (HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA) 
FUTURES UNIT, METHAMPHETAMINE: A UNIQUE THREAT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 3, 
available at http://www.hidta.org/programs/docs/040922_Meth_Report.pdf. 
82. NIDA INFOFACTS, supra note 79, at 2; NAT‘L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, RESEARCH 
REPORT: METHAMPHETAMINE, ABUSE AND ADDICTION 5-6 (2006) 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/RRMetham.pdf [hereinafter NIDA RESEARCH REPORT]. 
83. NAT‘L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., METHAMPHETAMINE LABORATORY 
IDENTIFICATION AND HAZARDS – FAST FACTS, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs7/7341/7341p.pdf; NIDA INFOFACTS, supra note 79, at 1-
2. 
84. NIDA RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 82; Methamphetamine Abuse Linked to 
Long-Term Damage to Brain Cells, SCI. DAILY, Mar. 28, 2000, available at 
13
2010] REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 1373 
on pregnant women and their children.  Although there is little 
conclusive research in the field,
85
 preliminary studies have shown that 
methamphetamine use during pregnancy can lead to premature delivery, 
birth deformities, learning disabilities, sleep disturbances, and altered 
behavior patterns.
86
  Moreover, babies born to methamphetamine users 
are often dependent on the drug themselves, and can suffer severe 
withdrawal symptoms.
87
 
Methamphetamine addicts pose a risk not only to themselves but to 
society at large.  Long-term abuse results in paranoia accompanied by 
hallucinations and delusions; it is not uncommon for these side effects to 
lead to violent behavior.
88
  Moreover, the risk of HIV and hepatitis 
transmission increases with methamphetamine use, regardless of how the 
drug is ingested.
89
  While injection of the drug increases transmission 
risk because of shared or dirty intravenous needles, abuse by any form 
impairs judgment and lowers inhibition, leading users to engage in 
especially risky sexual behavior.
90
 
While some recent studies suggest decreases in methamphetamine 
use among certain populations,
91
 these studies can be deceiving since the 
 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2000/03/000328084630.htm. 
85. See, e.g., NIDA RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 82; Trecia Wouldes et al., 
Maternal Methamphetamine Use During Pregnancy and Child Outcome: What Do We 
Know?, 117 N.Z. MED. J. 1 (2004), available at http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/117-
1206/1180. 
86. N.D. DEP‘T OF HEALTH, NEW MOTHER FACT SHEET: METHAMPHETAMINE USE 
DURING PREGNANCY (2002), available at 
http://www.kci.org/meth_info/Crank_Babies/MethamphetamineUseDuringPregnancy.pdf
. 
87. See, e.g., Cara Hetland, Children are the Unintended Victims of Meth, MINN. 
PUB. RADIO, June 14, 2004, available at 
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2004/06/14_hetlandc_methfostercare; 
American Pregnancy Association, Using Illegal Street Drugs During Pregnancy, 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancyhealth/illegaldrugs.html. 
88. NIDA INFOFACTS, supra note 79, at 2; NIDA RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 82, 
at 5-6. 
89. See sources cited supra note 88. 
90. Id. 
91. See, e.g., News Release, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, New National Survey Reveals Cocaine, Methamphetamine Use Drop 
Among Young Adults; Prescription Drug Abuse Increases (Sept. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.samhsa.gov/newsroom/advisories/0809033637.aspx (noting that 
methamphetamine use among young adults fell by a third between 2006 and 2007); 
Matthew S. Bajko, California: Crystal Meth Use Drops Among Gay Men, THE BODY, 
Nov. 4, 2005, http://www.thebody.com/content/art24673.html (noting that 
methamphetamine use among gay men dropped eight percent between late 2003 and 
early 2005); Jeremy Smerd, Screener Sees Drop in Positive Tests; Presence of Meth 
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drug tends to grow in ―pockets,‖ taking a severe toll on certain 
communities while leaving others essentially unaffected.
92
  Even 
assuming that there have been improvements over the last few years, 
methamphetamine use has grown considerably since the early 1990s.  In 
1992, there were approximately 21,000 methamphetamine-related 
rehabilitation admissions; by 2004, that number had skyrocketed to 
150,000.
93
  Similarly, a late-2005 survey found that seventy-three percent 
of respondent hospitals had seen an increase in methamphetamine-related 
emergency room visits over the preceding five years.
94
  The geographic 
scope of methamphetamine use is growing as well.  Since the early 
1990s, methamphetamine has grown from a regional drug found mostly 
in the West to one that is a problem in communities across the country.
95
  
In 1992, five states reported widespread use; by 2002, that number had 
ballooned to twenty-one.
96
 
These sobering statistics speak for themselves.  The Controlled 
Substances Act was enacted to curtail the manufacture, distribution, and 
use of illegal drugs in the United States.
97
  The overarching purpose was 
to protect the ―health and general welfare of the American people.‖98  
The provision in § 841 regulating and penalizing the sale or possession 
of a listed chemical is a critical tool in reaching this end, especially with 
regard to methamphetamine.  Pseudoephedrine is a nasal decongestant 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (―FDA‖), commonly 
found in over-the-counter cold medicines like Sudafed.
99
  This otherwise 
innocuous medication is the main ingredient used to synthesize 
methamphetamine;
100
 indeed, the drug can‘t be made without it.101 
 
Falls, WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT, July 19, 2006, 
http://www.workforce.com/section/00/article/24/44/07.php (citing drop in presence of 
methamphetamine in workplace drug tests). 
92. Brandee J. Tecson, Meth Use on the Rise Among Teens, MTV.COM, Apr. 18, 
2005, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1500303/20050418/index.jhtml?headlines=true. 
93. NIDA RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 82, at 3. 
94. Kate Zernike, Hospitals Say Meth Cases Are Rising, and Hurt Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at A10. 
95. Todd M. Durell et al., Prevalence of Nonmedical Methamphetamine Use in the 
United States, 3 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, PREVENTION, AND POL‘Y 19 (2008), 
available at http://www.substanceabusepolicy.com/content/3/1/19; NIDA RESEARCH 
REPORT, supra note 82. 
96. Durell et al., supra note 95. 
97. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970). 
98. Id. 
99. eMedicine Health, Medications and Drugs: Brand Names, 
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/drug-pseudoephedrine/article_em.htm. 
100. See Ken Miguel, Meth labs flourishing due to loophole, KGO-TV, July 15, 
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The government‘s effort to limit the sale of pseudoephedrine is an 
important tool in the fight against methamphetamine.  Section 841 is just 
one of several laws dealing with this problem.  A section of the Patriot 
Act requires all over-the-counter medications containing 
pseudoephedrine to be stored behind the pharmacy counter.
102
  
Additionally, state laws restricting the sale of pseudoephedrine have 
corresponded with a drop in the number of methamphetamine labs 
raided.
103
  Some have argued that pseudoephedrine needs to be even 
more tightly regulated.
104
 
Importantly, the risk of erroneous or unjust conviction discussed in 
Morissette and Liparota does not loom nearly as large in cases involving 
§ 841.  The Truong court pointed out that DEA agents regularly visit gas 
stations and convenience stores to notify their attendants of the bottle 
limit on pseudoephedrine sales, and of the health and legal dangers that 
are perpetuated by failing to abide by this standard.
105
  Additionally, the 
DEA regularly issues ―Red Notices‖ to pseudoephedrine distributors, 
warning them about restrictions on its sale.
106
  Thus, the risk of an 
erroneous or unjust conviction of a store worker is greatly diminished by 
the government‘s role in informing them of the regulations at issue.  In 
turn, a customer attempting to buy more than the maximum number of 
bottles will be notified by the attendant that he has exceeded the limit, 
and is therefore put on notice that attempting to buy additional drugs at 
 
2009, http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/assignment_7&id=6917364. 
101. Sudafed Restrictions Lead to Decrease in Police Meth Lab Seizures, TENN. 
JOURNALIST, June 20, 2007, http://tnjn.com/2007/jun/20/sudafed-restrictions-lead-to-d 
[hereinafter Sudafed Restrictions]. 
102. USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-177, §§ 701-56, 120 Stat. 192 (2006); Sudafed Restrictions, supra note 101. 
103. North Carolina: Number Of Methamphetamine Labs Drops, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
4, 2006, at A20; Sudafed Restrictions, supra note 101 (noting that after laws required 
pseudoephedrine to be moved behind the pharmacy counter Oklahoma saw a seventy 
percent decrease in methamphetamine lab seizures; Tennessee, thirty percent). 
104. See Heffernan, supra note 78 (noting that some experts argue that ―the 
regulations should extend to the bulk sale of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine 
internationally‖). 
105. United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 2005). 
106. United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2000).  See also United 
States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the defendant, a 
chemical company manager, was ―provided . . . with a ‗Red Notice,‘ warning that 
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine products were being seized at meth laboratories, that 
suspicious orders should be immediately reported to the local DEA office, and that any 
person distributing or possessing these products with knowledge or reasonable belief that 
they will be used to manufacture a controlled substance is in violation of [§ 841]‖). 
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another store is prohibited by the statute.
107
 
 
C. The Subjective Mens Rea Standard Results in an Excessive 
Prosecutorial Burden 
 
Moreover, the subjective mens rea standard is vague at best and 
makes it extremely difficult for the prosecution to prove a defendant‘s 
culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Tenth Circuit cases show 
that even copious evidence implicating a defendant can be insufficient to 
convict him.  In Truong, for instance, the defendant kept unmarked 
bottles underneath the cash register, repeatedly sold large amounts of 
pseudoephedrine to regular customers, and often ―fronted‖ the 
medication to them when they were unable to pay immediately.
108
  
Truong obtained the pill bottles from ―a man who brought them to the 
store periodically,‖ and who allowed Truong to pay for the drugs after he 
had sold them.
109
  The amount of pseudoephedrine he sold was 
staggering—one customer regularly bought 1000-count bottles for $420 
each and once bought ten of those bottles at the same time.
110
 
Additionally, Truong sold the medication in what the court 
conceded was a ―litany of suspicious circumstances.‖111  After the store 
closed and all the lights were turned off, interested customers would 
knock on the door, at which point Truong let them in to buy the 
pseudoephedrine.
112
  He did not enter the sales into the cash register, nor 
did he provide a receipt, although he performed these actions for any 
other items the customers bought with the pills.
113
  Truong regularly 
concealed the customers‘ pill bottles in Styrofoam cups, complete with a 
lid and straw, even though the purchasers never asked him to do so.
114
  
The court readily admitted that Truong‘s behavior ―would surely have 
put any reasonable person on notice that something nefarious was going 
on.‖115 
To reverse a defendant‘s conviction, even with undisputed evidence 
of such conduct, simply because there was no evidence conclusively 
 
107. See generally Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1263. 
108. Truong, 425 F.3d at 1285-86. 
109. Id. at 1285. 
110. Id. at 1286. 
111. Id. at 1287. 
112. Id. at 1286. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1290. 
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showing that ―Mr. Truong knew that his purchasers would use the 
substance to manufacture methamphetamine,‖116 sets an impossibly high 
burden for the prosecution, even considering the heightened standard of 
proof required in criminal cases.  It also does not square with the court‘s 
decision to uphold the conviction in Saffo, where the defendant‘s conduct 
was only slightly more incriminating, if at all.
117
 
The Saffo case, like Truong, contained copious evidence indicating 
that the defendant was up to no good.  As previously noted, Saffo 
ordered that her name be kept off of paperwork, destroyed box labels that 
contained identifying information, rented storage units under fake names, 
and provided the DEA with purported customer lists that included non-
existent business names.
118
  Additionally, during a conversation secretly 
recorded by the DEA, Saffo acknowledged a Red Notice; later, however, 
she told the Agency that she had never seen one before.
119
  While this 
evidence is certainly incriminating, to say the least, it does not seem to 
differ significantly from the facts in Truong.  Indeed, the court‘s sole 
piece of evidence indicating actual knowledge on Saffo‘s part is that she 
was also convicted of money laundering.
120
  The court had no so-called 
smoking gun statement or definitive admission that Saffo knew the pills 
were being used to make methamphetamine. 
One of Saffo‘s co-defendants at trial, Nouhad Rached El-Hajjaoui, 
did make such a statement.  When a concerned employee confronted him 
about bogus customer lists submitted by Saffo‘s company, El-Hajjaoui 
snapped, ―How much of this do you think is going out on the street? . . . 
Seventy to 75 percent of it is going out on the street.  And you need to 
know it, if you can live with that or not.‖121  Such a statement—one that 
clearly and unequivocally indicates that the defendant knew where the 
pseudoephedrine would end up—seems to be the only evidence that 
would definitively satisfy the subjective mens rea standard adopted by 
the Tenth Circuit.  For that reason, more than any other, the subjective 
standard is untenable. 
 
116. Id. at 1291. 
117. United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2000). 
118. Id. at 1264-66. 
119. Id. at 1265-66. 
120. ―The fact that the jury convicted Saffo of money laundering means at the very 
least that it found Saffo actually knew that she had reasonable cause to believe that the 
pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture methamphetamine under [§ 841].‖  Id. at 
1269-70. 
121. Id. at 1264. 
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Indeed, cases in which the objective mens rea standard is employed 
yield much more reasonable and uniform results.  United States v. Kaur 
offers an illustrative example.  As in Truong, the defendant in this case 
was a convenience store operator convicted of selling pseudoephedrine 
in excess of the legal limit.
122
  The evidence against Kaur was 
considerable, to say the least.  When a confidential informant with the 
DEA entered Kaur‘s store to discuss purchasing a case of 
pseudoephedrine, Kaur at first seemed receptive and discussed prices 
with him.
123
  However, when the informant produced a Department of 
Health CPR identification card, Kaur became hesitant and eventually 
declined to sell him the pills.
124
  About a month later, the informant 
returned and spoke with Kaur‘s husband, Singh, who also worked at the 
store, about purchasing a case of pseudoephedrine.
125
  Singh said that his 
wife had confided that she believed the informant was a ―cop.‖126  Kaur 
subsequently arrived at the store with two brown grocery bags, 
containing 159 boxes of pseudoephedrine pills, which the informant 
purchased.
127
  Four days later, the informant purchased another large 
quantity of pseudoephedrine from Singh.
128
 
A DEA search of Kaur‘s store uncovered more incriminating 
evidence.  Agents found a full case—144 boxes—of pseudoephedrine in 
the store‘s back room, but none on the shelves with the other over-the-
counter medications.
129
  The agents also discovered a letter from the state 
liquor board warning Kaur that pseudoephedrine is commonly used to 
make methamphetamine; on the envelope, Kaur had written, ―Raj Ji, we 
have to be very, very careful this product.‖130  The Ninth Circuit upheld 
Kaur‘s conviction using an objective mens rea requirement, holding that: 
 
Ms. Kaur had reasonable cause to believe if she actually 
knew facts that would alert a reasonable person that the 
pseudoephedrine would be used to make 
methamphetamine. . . . [T]he government had to prove 
 
122. United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004). 
123. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, United States v. Kaur, Nos. 03-30306, 03-
30326 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2004). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 8. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 8-9. 
128. Id. at 9. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
19
2010] REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 1379 
that Ms. Kaur either knew, or knew facts that would 
have made a reasonable person aware, that the 
pseudoephedrine would be used to make 
methamphetamine.
131
 
 
The evidence in United States v. Estrada, another case utilizing an 
objective standard, was even more incriminating than that in Kaur.  The 
defendant, Estrada, was found ―conscious but dazed‖ next to an 
overturned truck on a remote California road.
132
  Inside the truck, officers 
found 178 pounds of pseudoephedrine pills, along with denatured 
alcohol, acetone, and other items indicating that the materials would be 
used to manufacture methamphetamine.
133
  Officers recovered a Home 
Depot receipt for the denatured alcohol, and video footage of a man 
resembling Estrada leaving Home Depot at the time of the purchase.
134
  
Police also seized several items from a storage locker, including a type of 
flask used to make methamphetamine.
135
  The flask had Estrada‘s 
fingerprints on it and it contained iodide residue, indicating that it was in 
fact used to produce the drug.
136
  The court upheld Estrada‘s conviction, 
applying an objective mens rea standard and even going so far as to hold 
that Estrada need not know the identity of the chemical for his conviction 
to stand.
137
 
These cases demonstrate the drastically different outcomes that can 
result from similar facts, depending on which mens rea standard is 
applied.  All four cases involve evidence indicating that the defendants at 
least knew that their conduct was illegal, and likely were aware that the 
pseudoephedrine they possessed would be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine.  However, as demonstrated by Truong, even the most 
damning evidence may not be enough for conviction when a subjective 
standard is employed.  There is little doubt that had Truong been tried in 
the Ninth Circuit, where Kaur and Estrada were decided, he would have 
been convicted.  The evidence in Truong was more than sufficient to 
indicate that the defendant had reason to believe the drugs would end up 
in a methamphetamine lab. 
 
131. United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2004). 
132. United States v. Estrada, 453 F.3d 1208, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2006). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1210. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1211-12. 
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III.  Conclusion 
 
In balancing the grave effects of methamphetamine abuse against 
the danger of erroneous or unjust conviction, it becomes clear that an 
objective mens rea standard is more than sufficient to safeguard the 
defendant‘s liberty.  A jury will still have to find that the accused, at the 
very least, should have known that the pseudoephedrine he was 
distributing would be used to make methamphetamine.  If the 
prosecution does not prove this beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant 
will be acquitted.  Thus, an objective mens rea still puts the burden on 
the prosecution to show that the defendant acted knowing full well the 
consequences of his actions (or at the very least, that he was reckless in 
not foreseeing those consequences).  Indeed, this standard is still 
relatively lenient given the law‘s admonition that ―ignorance of the law 
is no excuse.‖138  Under the objective standard, there will be no 
conviction without a showing that the defendant should have known 
where the pseudoephedrine would end up, despite the widely-publicized 
limits on how much of the cold medication can be purchased at one time. 
Equally important, the objective standard will further the critical 
aim of reducing methamphetamine use in this country.  The 
consequences of methamphetamine abuse for society are too serious, and 
their effects too wide-reaching, to justify requiring the prosecution to 
prove absolute knowledge from the subjective standpoint of the 
defendant.  The objective mens rea standard will better serve one of 
criminal law‘s well-established purposes—deterrence.139  One of the 
main assumptions underlying criminal law is that individuals will act in 
accordance with prohibitions set forth in the law.
140
  If a crime is 
 
138. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998); Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
139. The objective standard would be especially instrumental in achieving general 
deterrence, which serves to discourage individuals other than the accused from 
committing a crime.  See Miriam Gur-Arye, Reliance on a Lawyer’s Mistaken Advice – 
Should it be an Excuse from Criminal Liability?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 464 (2002). 
140. Id.  Indeed, some commentators suggest that deterrence is criminal law‘s 
―primary‖ or ―core‖ purpose.  Jennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Deck Chairs on the 
Titanic: Why the Incarceration of Individuals with Serious Mental Illnesses Violates 
Public Health, Ethical, and Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made 
Right by Piecemeal Changes to the Insanity Defense, 5 HOUS. J. OF HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 1, 
62 n.315 (2005) (citing Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in 
the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 
949, 957 (2003)).  See also KADISH ET AL., supra note 14, at 92-97. 
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narrowly defined, people are more likely to behave in a manner that the 
law intended to prevent; the statutory language essentially provides a 
loophole for defendants who have acted contrary to its tenets.
141
  
Knowing that these loopholes exist, individuals are more likely to simply 
disregard the law altogether.
142
 
One of the chief risks of a subjective mens rea standard is that it 
allows any defendant, no matter how damning his actions, to argue that 
he ―didn‘t know‖ the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine.  Indeed, the standard set by Truong suggests that this 
defense will very often work.  This poses the very real danger of 
reducing § 841 to a farce, and providing no meaningful legal deterrence 
to individuals whose actions aggravate the serious and growing 
methamphetamine problem facing the country. 
By contrast, allowing conviction for individuals who, like Truong 
and Kaur, sell or distribute large quantities of pseudoephedrine despite 
having received Red Notices or some other indication that their actions 
are promoting illegal behavior, puts all others on notice that their 
behavior is likely to result in conviction as well.  The objective mens rea 
standard provides no cover for the defendant to claim that he was 
unaware of the consequences of his acts, when all available evidence 
suggests otherwise.  This will discourage individuals from acting in any 
fashion that could be seen as giving them reasonable knowledge that 
pseudoephedrine in their possession will be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine, and may even provide them with an incentive to 
report suspicious activity to the authorities, given their personal stake in 
the outcome.
143
  Thus, an objective mens rea standard under § 841 not 
only makes sound legal sense, but will be an important step in curbing 
the manufacture and use of methamphetamine in the United States. 
All of the factors discussed supra—the plain meaning of § 841, the 
dangers posed to society by methamphetamine, the safeguards in place to 
prevent erroneous or unjust conviction, and society‘s interest in 
preventing pseudoephedrine from ending up in methamphetamine labs—
argue decisively for an objective mens rea standard.  If America‘s 
methamphetamine problem continues to grow, it will likely be only a 
 
141. Gur-Arye, supra note 139, at 464. 
142. See generally id. 
143. See generally Agnolucci, supra note 36, at 364.  The stakes for individuals 
convicted under § 841 are considerable.  The statute provides for prison sentences of up 
to twenty years, 21 U.S.C. § 841(c) (2006), and courts are not hesitant to impose lengthy 
sentences.  At trial, Saffo was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 121 and 120 
months.  United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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matter of time before the Supreme Court addresses and resolves the 
circuit split.  If and when that day comes, the high court would be wise to 
follow the lead of the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and require 
an objective mens rea standard. 
23
